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Abstract
The coalition formation problem in an economy with externali-
ties can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function
form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose
that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus,
a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition
to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking
into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in
this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and
coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of
players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given
coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of
the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account),
respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition forma-
tion value.
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1 Introduction
The coalition formation problem is one of the important issues of economics
and game theory, both in cooperative and non-cooperative games. There
are several attempts to analyze this problem (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra [15],
Diamantoudi and Xue [6], Funaki and Yamato [9], and Bloch [3]).
If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total
surplus, it is natural to assume that the grand coalition structure will even-
tually form after some negotiations. Then, the worth of the grand coalition
has to be allocated to the individual players, according to the contribution of
each player. The question is how to do that, taking into account the whole
process of coalition formation.
In a coalition formation problem, it is important to consider the structure
of the society (i.e., how it is partitioned), since it may affect the worth of
a given coalition. This refers in economy to situations with externalities.
Such situations are best represented by games in partition function form
(PFF games for short; they are also often called games with externalities)
introduced by Thrall and Lucas [16] (see also Funaki and Yamato [9]). A
partition function assigns a worth to each pair consisting of a coalition and a
coalition structure (partition) which contains that coalition. Such pairs are
called embedded coalitions.
Then the above problem of allocation of the worth of the grand coalition
amounts to defining a suitable solution concept or value for PFF games. For
TU games, one of the best known solutions is the Shapley value. This so-
lution concept is based on the marginal contribution of players when they
enter the game one by one, considering all possible orders. There are already
many attempts to define a modification of the Shapley value for PFF games,
e.g., by Myerson [14], Bolger [4], Pham Do and Norde [7], de Clippel and
Serrano [5], Albizuri et al. [1], Macho-Stadler et al. [13], etc. They pro-
posed several new kinds of null player or dummy player axioms, and carrier
axioms, which are extensions of the original axioms in TU games. Then the
resulting formulas are averaging of marginal contributions of players when
the players enter the game one by one. However, these approaches do not
reflect the process of coalition formation from singletons coalition structure
to the grand coalition structure. Since in TU games, the process of entering
of the players is expressed by some order on coalitions, in PFF games the
process of coalition formation should concern not only coalitions but also
the corresponding coalitions structures. Hence, it should be expressed by an
order on embedded coalitions.
Mathematically, the set of embedded coalitions has a much more compli-
cated structure than the lattice structure of coalitions in a TU game, however,
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they share similar properties, for example, all maximal chains (paths from
the minimal element to the maximal element) are of the same length. This
means that a coalition formation process from the singleton coalition struc-
ture to the grand coalition structure in a PFF game has always the same
number of steps.
Our idea is to take advantage of the structure of embedded coalitions
endowed with a suitable ordering, where maximal chains depict the different
ways of forming coalitions. Doing so, we can propose a new value for PFF
games, which is rooted in the process of coalition formation, and consequently
differs from the classical view of the Shapley value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces em-
bedded coalitions and their structure, Section 3 gives a motivating example
showing the insufficiency of the values proposed so far, and Section 4 gives
the definition of scenarios and processes. Section 5 introduces our coalition
formation value, through scenario-values and process-values. Next, we intro-
duce the axioms giving rise to what we call the egalitarian scenario-value,
and we give also a second axiomatization of it. Then we give an explicit
expression of the coalition formation value, and finally we give the relation
with the Shapley value when the game has no externalities. Section 6 applies
the coalition formation value to the motivating example, and Section 7 con-
cludes the paper by giving a comparison with other values for PFF games.
Long proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Partitions and embedded coalitions
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. We denote by S, T, . . . , the
subsets of N , called coalitions, and their cardinality by s, t, . . .. A parti-
tion pi := {S1, . . . , Sk}, also called coalition structure, is a collection of dis-
joint nonempty coalitions S1, . . . , Sk with ∪kl=1Sl = N . Subsets S1, . . . , Sk
are called blocks of pi. We denote by Π(N) or Π(n) the set of all possible
partitions of N . A natural ordering of partitions is given by the notion of
“coarsening” or “refinement”. Taking pi, pi′ partitions in Π(N), we say that
pi is a refinement of pi′ or pi′ is a coarsening of pi, denoted by pi ≤ pi′, if any
block of pi is contained in a block of pi′ (or equivalently, every block of pi′
fully decomposes into blocks of pi). Then (Π(N),≤) is a lattice, called the
partition lattice. With this ordering, the bottom element of the lattice is the
finest partition pi⊥ := {{1}, . . . , {n}} called the singletons coalition structure,
while the top element is the coarsest partition pi⊤ := {N} called the grand
coalition structure.
An embedded coalition is a pair (S, pi), where S ∈ 2N \ {∅} is a coalition,
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and pi is a coalition structure such that S ∈ pi. We also call S the base
coalition of (S, pi). We denote by Σ(N) (or by Σ(n)) the set of embedded
coalitions on N . For the sake of concision, we often denote by Spi the em-
bedded coalition (S, pi), and omit braces and commas for subsets (example:
12{12, 3} instead of ({1, 2}, {{1, 2}, {3}})). We propose the following order
relation on embedded coalitions:
(S, pi) ⊑ (S ′, pi′)⇔ S ⊆ S ′ and pi ≤ pi′.
(this can be read: (S, pi) is before (S ′, pi′)) Evidently, the top element of
this ordered set is (N, pi⊤) (denoted more simply by N{N} according to our
convention). However, due to the fact that the empty set is not allowed
in (S, pi), there is no bottom element in the ordered structure (Σ(N),⊑).
Indeed, all elements of the form ({i}, pi⊥) are minimal elements (i.e., there is
no smaller element than them). For mathematical convenience, we introduce
an artificial bottom element ⊥ to Σ(N) (it could be considered as (∅, pi⊥)),
and denote Σ(N)⊥ := Σ(N) ∪ {⊥}. We give as illustration the partially
ordered set (Σ(N)⊥,⊑) with n = 3 (Fig. 1).
⊥
1{1, 2, 3}2{1, 2, 3}3{1, 2, 3}
12{12, 3}3{12, 3}1{1, 23}23{1, 23}13{13, 2}2{13, 2}
123{123}
Figure 1: Diagram of (Σ(N)⊥,⊑) for n = 3. Elements with the same parti-
tion are framed in grey.
Definition 1. A game in partition function form (PFF-game in short) on N
is a mapping v : Σ(N)⊥ → R, such that v(⊥) = 0. The set of all PFF-games
on N is denoted by Γ(N).
Following the usual interpretation, the payoff for coalition S depends on
the situation of the outsiders, depicted by the partition pi, which represents
the externalities in an economy.
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To be meaningful, we assume that forming the grand coalition generates
the largest total surplus, i.e., v(N{N}) ≥ ∑S∈pi v(S, pi), for all pi ∈ Π(N).
Hence, we consider economic environments where doing so is the best for the
society and the total surplus v(N{N}) is distributed among the players in
the society.
We recall that in a partially ordered set (P,≤) with a bottom element ⊥
and a top element ⊤, a chain from ⊥ to ⊤ is a totally ordered sequence of
elements of P including ⊥,⊤. The chain is maximal if no other chain can
contain it (equivalently, if between two consecutive elements xi, xi+1 of the
sequence, there is no element x ∈ P such that xi < x < xi+1). If no ambiguity
occurs, we say maximal chain instead of maximal chain from ⊥ to ⊤. The set
of maximal chains in P is denoted by C(P ). The length of a maximal chain
is the number of elements of the sequence minus 1. If all maximal chains
have the same length, this length is the height of the partially ordered set.
In Fig. 1, the sequence ⊥, 1{1, 2, 3}, 1{1, 23}, 123{123} is a maximal chain,
and there are 9 maximal chains in total, all of length 3, hence the height of
(Σ(123)⊥,⊑) is 3. In [12], it is proved that (Σ(N)⊥,⊑) is a lattice, whose
maximal chains have all the same length n. The combinatorial complexity of
(Σ(N)⊥,⊑) is far beyond the complexity of the Boolean lattice of coalitions
in a TU game. In [12], it is proved that the number of maximal chains from
⊥ to (N, {N}) is |C(Σ(n)⊥)| = (n!)22n−1 . For simplicity, we put c := |C(Σ(n)⊥)|
and it is shown in [12] that |C(Π(n))| = c
n
.
3 A motivating example
We consider Cournot oligopoly games where players are firms, particularly
the simple case where the games are symmetric, in the sense that the worth of
the embedded coalition depends only on the number of blocks of the partition,
i.e., v(S, pi) = vk, where pi = {S, S1, . . . , Sk−1} (see below, and Funaki and
Yamato for practical examples of such games [9]).
Because most of the values for PFF games presented so far obey the clas-
sical symmetry axiom, saying that the value is invariant under permutations,
(see Section 7 for details), they will lead to the equal division of v(N, {N}),
for each firm. However, this result is too simplistic and does not reflect in
which way the firms merged together to form the grand coalition. Let us
consider two extreme cases of coalition formation. In the first one, a new
firm joins the current coalition at each step, i.e., starting from firm 1 alone,
firm 2 merges with firm 1, then firm 3 joins, etc. This leads to the sequence of
partitions {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , n}, {12, 3, 4, . . . , n}, {123, 4, . . . , n}, . . . , {N}. Note
that this way of forming the grand coalition is exactly what Shapley de-
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scribed when defining his value for TU-games. By contrast to this very
unbalanced way of forming the grand coalition, the second case considers
that first firms merge by pairs, then these pairs merge again by pair, and so
on till forming the grand coalition. This leads to a perfectly balanced way
of forming N , provided n is of the form 2k. For example, with n = 8, we
get: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} then {12, 34, 56, 78}, then {1234, 5678} and {N}. It
is hard to admit that in both situations, the contribution of a firm i should
be the same, i.e., v(N, {N})/n.
Let us be more specific and consider the following Cournot model with n
identical firms. Let xi be firm i’s output (i = 1, . . . , n). The inverse demand
function is given by p = a−∑ni=1 xi, and the total cost function of firm i is
cxi, where a > c > 0. Given a coalition structure pi = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk}, we
assume that each coalition Sj is a player who chooses the total output level of
its firms to maximize the sum of their profits, given the output levels of other
coalitions. Then it is easy to check that the total profit of each coalition Sj
at a unique Nash equilibrium is given by (a−c)
2
(k+1)2
. Without loss of generality,
we assume that a− c = 1. This gives
vk =
1
(k + 1)2
.
This implies vn−1− vn < vn−2− vn−1 < ... < v2− v3 < v1− v2. Consider now
the first way (Shapley-like) of forming the grand coalition: {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , n},
{12, 3, 4, . . . , n}, {123, 4, . . . , n}, . . . , {N}. The marginal contribution of firm
2 is proportional to vn−1 − vn, much smaller than v1 − v2, which is the
contribution of firm n, entering the last. Therefore, it is counterintuitive
that their values are equal.
On the other hand, the way the grand coalition is formed in the second
situation is perfectly symmetric, since any permutation on the firms does
not change the role of the firms in the coalition formation (which is not
true in the previous situation: permuting firms 1 and n makes them have a
totally different role): Every single firm makes a two-person coalition when
making the first coalition. Next, two-person coalitions merge into 4-person
coalitions, and so on. In each step, both coalitions have the same power.
Then one expects that every firm has an equal contribution.
In summary, we believe that the exact way how coalitions form (we call
this a process, see Definition 2) should be taken into account into the com-
putation of the value. So far, the values presented in the literature do not
possess this feature.
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4 Processes and scenarios
Let us describe what we mean by a process of coalition formation. We con-
sider that we start from the society of individual players, and after several
steps of negotiation, the grand coalition has formed. This is guaranteed by
our assumption above. Moreover, we consider that at each step, exactly two
blocks (coalitions) of the current partition merge to form a new coalition.
Also, we discard the possibility for a block to split in several blocks, for this
would considerably complicate the analysis, and is anyway unlikely to occur
in economic environments where the grand coalition generates the largest
surplus. In summary:
Definition 2. A coalition formation process p is any maximal chain in Π(n),
i.e., a sequence of partitions starting from pi⊥ (singleton coalition structure)
and ending at {N} (the grand coalition). The set of processes is therefore
C(Π(n)), which we denote simply by P.
Our second fundamental ingredient is the notion of scenario. Let us
consider some process p. A process is an “external” description of how
coalitions form, as it could be seen by some observer outside the game. Let
us now consider an “internal” view by some player i ∈ N . At the initial
step, player i is alone, and during the subsequent steps, s/he will join with
some other blocks, to become finally included in N . Hence, the sequence of
embedded coalitions (S1, pi1), . . . , (Sn, pin), where the sequence pi1, . . . , pin is
p itself, and S1 = {i}, Sn = N and all S2, . . . , Sn−1 contain i, is the internal
view of the process p, seen by player i. We call this the scenario for player i
(in the process p).
Definition 3. Let p = pi1, . . . , pin−1, N be a process. A scenario s induced by
process p is any maximal chain in Σ(n)⊥ of the form⊥, S1pi1, . . . , Sn−1pin−1, N{N}.
We denote by s← p the fact that s is induced by p.
The set of all scenarios, considering all processes, is therefore C(Σ(n)⊥),
denoted by S for simplicity.
For a given process p, there are n scenarios si, i ∈ N . For example, in a
3 persons game with N = {1, 2, 3}, we have three processes:
p1 : {1, 2, 3} → {12, 3} → {123}
p2 : {1, 2, 3} → {13, 2} → {123}
p3 : {1, 2, 3} → {1, 23} → {123}
In process p2, first players 1 and 3 merge, then coalitions 13 and 2 merge
and form the grand coalition. A process describes how exactly the coalition
structure evolves step by step, by a process of coalition formation.
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Each coalition process has three scenarios. In the above example, process
p2 has the following three scenarios:
s1 : ⊥ → 1{1, 2, 3} → 13{13, 2} → 123{123}
s2 : ⊥ → 2{1, 2, 3} → 2{13, 2} → 123{123}
s3 : ⊥ → 3{1, 2, 3} → 13{13, 2} → 123{123}
In s1, player 1 first merges with player 3 at the singletons coalition structure,
then this base coalition 13 containing player 1 merges with player 2 and
becomes the grand coalition structure.
In a scenario s, some elements play a special role. We consider those
elements Spi such that in the sequence of elements of s from bottom to
top, Spi is the last element with base coalition S. They are called terminal
elements. Specifically, let us denote s by
s = {⊥, S1pi1,1, . . . , S1pi1,m1 , S2pi2,1, . . . , S2pi2,m2 , . . . , Skpik,1, . . . , Skpik,mk , N{N}},
(1)
with S1 ( · · · ( Sk 6= N . Then the terminal elements are Sipii,mi , i =
1, . . . , k. We denote by F(s) this family of elements. A terminal element is
an embedded coalition such that the base coalition of the embedded coalition
changes at the next step in the scenario.
Example 1. We consider 4 players and the following process p:
{1, 2, 3, 4} → {13, 2, 4} → {13, 24} → {1234}.
and the four different scenarios in p where terminal elements are in bold:
s1 : ⊥ → 1{1, 2, 3, 4} → 13{13, 2, 4} → 13{13, 24} → N{N}
s2 : ⊥ → 2{1, 2, 3, 4} → 2{13, 2, 4} → 24{13, 24} → N{N}
s3 : ⊥ → 3{1, 2, 3, 4} → 13{13, 2, 4} → 13{13, 24} → N{N}
s4 : ⊥ → 4{1, 2, 3, 4} → 4{13, 2, 4} → 24{13, 24} → N{N}
In scenario s1, player 1 first merges with player 3, then this coalition remains
unchanged in the next step, and finally base coalition 13 merges with coali-
tion 24, and becomes the grand coalition. Note that the second embedded
coalition is not a terminal element because at the next step the base coalition
does not change (player 1 is not concerned by the move).
5 Values for coalition formation processes
In this section, we introduce our concept of value for PFF games. Since
it is based on an interpretation in terms of coalition formation, we call it
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a coalition formation value. This name emphasizes that it differs from the
usual coalitional values, like the Shapley value and its generalizations to PFF
games. Their exact relationship will be studied in Section 5.5.
5.1 Scenario-values, process-values and values
Consider again the initial state of the society where all players are individual,
and no coalition has formed. We know from the previous section that under
our assumptions finally the grand coalition will form, following some process
p, and our aim is to share the total surplus of the game among the play-
ers, taking into account the contribution of each player during the coalition
formation process. Here, two situations can arise: either we know precisely
the process p (i.e., the grand coalition has formed and we observed how it
was formed, like in the Cournot example in Section 3), or we do not know
it, either because we were not able to observe the process, or because the
process has not yet realized. In the first situation, it seems natural to make
the calculation of the sharing by using only those embedded coalitions (S, pi)
which are related to the process p, in other words, all (S, pi) in the n scenarios
of p, the other ones being irrelevant. We call the sharing obtained in this way
a process-value. In the second situation, our ignorance obliges us to use a
priori all embedded coalitions, since any process may realize or have realized.
If we have no knowledge at all about the process, the principle of insufficient
reason tells us that we should consider equally all processes; therefore, our
value will be the arithmetic mean of the process-values, for all possible pro-
cesses p ∈ P. Otherwise, we may define some weight vector on each process
(or even on scenarios), representing, e.g., a probability of occurence of each
process, and compute a weighted arithmetic mean. Hence, depending on
the practical situation under consideration, either the process-value or the
(weighted) value is better suited.
Let us now consider a given process p and define the process-value. Un-
like global games [11] which assigns worths to partitions —and therefore
processes fully make sense for them, PFF games assign worths to coalitions
given a partition, and therefore we must consider the n scenarios induced
by a process, i.e., all possible sequences of embedded coalitions pertaining to
the same process. In each scenario, we should compute the contribution of
each player, which we call the scenario-value.
Summarizing the above discussion, we are lead to the following definition.
Definition 4. (i) A scenario-value is a mapping ψ : Γ(N) → Rn×|S|.
Components of ψ(v) are denoted by ψsi (v) for scenario s and player i.
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If there is no confusion, we also call each component ψsi (v) a scenario-
value.
(ii) A process-value is a mapping ψ : Γ(N)→ Rn×|P|. Components of ψ(v)
are denoted by ψpi (v) for process p and player i. If there is no confusion,
we also call each component ψpi (v) a process-value. Any scenario-value
ψ induces a process-value (denoted with some abuse by the same letter
ψ) by:
ψpi (v) :=
1
n
∑
s←p
ψsi (v), i ∈ N,p ∈ P.
(iii) A value is a mapping ψ : Γ(N)→ Rn. Components of ψ(v) are denoted
by ψi(v) for player i. Any scenario-value or process-value ψ induces a
value by:
ψi(v) :=
n
c
∑
p∈P
ψpi (v) =
1
c
∑
s∈S
ψsi (v), (2)
where we recall that c is the number of scenarios (maximal chains in
Σ(N)). More generally, weighted values can be considered as well:
ψi(v) =
∑
p∈P wpψ
p
i (v), with wp ≥ 0 and
∑
p∈P wp = 1, or ψi(v) =∑
s∈S wsψ
s
i (v).
5.2 Axioms
A scenario-value satisfies linearity (L) if it is linear on the set of
PFF-games. We define similarly linearity for process-values and
values.
Proposition 1. If ψ is a linear scenario-value, then for all v ∈ Γ(N)
ψsi (v) =
∑
Spi∈Σ(n)
γi
s,Spiv(Spi), ∀i ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S
for some real constants γi
s,Spi (and similarly for a linear process-value, with
constants γi
p,Spi, and for a linear value, with constants γ
i
Spi).
Proof. As usual, consider the elementary PFF-games eSpi(S
′pi′) := 1 iff Spi =
S ′pi′ and 0 otherwise, for all Spi ∈ Σ(n). Then linearity for scenario-values
implies:
ψ(v) = ψ
( ∑
Spi∈Σ(n)
v(Spi)eSpi
)
=
∑
Spi∈Σ(n)
v(Spi)ψ(eSpi),
hence the result, letting ψsi (eSpi)) =: γ
i
s,Spi for i ∈ N , s ∈ S.
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Definition 5. Let us consider i ∈ N , a scenario s, and denote by S−pi−
the last element in s not containing i, and Spi its successor in F(s), as in
Figure 2. Player i is null in scenario s for v if v(Spi) = v(S−pi−). Player i is
null for v if i is null for every scenario s.
⊥
S−pi−0
...
S−pi−
Spi0
...
Spi
N{N}
i 6∈
i ∈
Figure 2: Notation used for scenario s (terminal elements are in black, others
are in grey)
Scenario Null axiom (SN): If i is null in scenario s for v, then
ψsi (v) = 0.
If i is null for every scenario s, then ψi(v) = 0 (null axiom for the induced
value), but the converse does not hold, that is, if ψi(v) = 0 holds, then i is
not necessary null in every scenario.
Proposition 2. Under (L) and (SN), for every scenario s, every player i,
the scenario-value reads
ψsi (v) = γ
i
s,Spi
(
v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)) (3)
with notation of Fig 2, and with real constants γi
s,Spi, i ∈ N , s ∈ S.
Proof. Take any scenario s, and define v(Spi) = v(S−pi−) = 1 and v(S ′pi′) = 0
otherwise. Then i is null for v in s. Then by (SN) we get γi
s,S−pi−
+γi
s,Spi = 0.
Now take v′ = v, except on a single element S ′pi′ ∈ Σ(n) different from
S−pi−, Spi. Since i is still null for v′ in s, we get by (SN) that γi
s,S′pi′ = 0.
The following is the usual symmetry axiom, but unlike in the classical
case, its effect on the simplification of the gamma coefficients will be much
weaker.
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Symmetry axiom for the scenario-value (SS): For any i ∈
N , any s ∈ S, and any permutation σ on N , it holds
ψsi (v) = ψ
σ(s)
σ(i) (v ◦ σ−1)
with σ(s), σ(S, pi) defined naturally as follows: σ(S, pi) = (σ(S), σ(pi)),
where σ(S) = {σ(i) | i ∈ S}, σ(pi) = {σ(S) | S ∈ pi}, and
σ(s) = {σ(S, pi) | (S, pi) ∈ s}.
For any scenario s := (⊥, S1pi1, . . . , Snpin = N{N}), we can define what we
call its signature, which is the part of the scenario being invariant under
permutations. For this, we need an unambiguous way to arrange blocks in
the embedded coalitions (i.e., the components of the partitions) of s. First,
for pi1 = pi
⊥, an order on the blocks (singletons) is fixed. Then, for any pik,
k = 2, . . . , n−1, the blocks are arranged in decreasing order of their size, and
blocks of same size are arranged in the lexicographic order induced by the
order on singletons. We call this the induced ordering. Now, the signature
of s, assuming that blocks are arranged with the induced ordering, is the se-
quence τ(s) := ((s1, ρ(pi1), (i1, j1)), . . . , (sn−1, ρ(pin−1), (in−1, jn−1)), (n, (n))),
where ρ(pik) is the sequence of cardinalities of blocks of pik, and (ik, jk) de-
notes the index numbers of blocks in pik which are merged to form pik+1
1.
Note that there are at most n! different scenarios with the same signature,
generated by all permutations on N .
Example 2. Consider the scenario s given by
1{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} → 12{12, 3, 4, 5} → 12{12, 34, 5} → 125{125, 34} → 12345{12345}.
Its signature’s long and shortest versions are
τ(s) =((1, (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 2)), (2, (2, 1, 1, 1), (2, 3)), (2, (2, 2, 1), (1, 3)),
(3, (3, 2), (1, 2)), (5, (5)))
τ(s) =(1; (1, 2), (2, 3), (1, 3)).
The scenario s′ given by
4{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} → 14{14, 2, 3, 5} → 14{14, 2, 35} → 124{124, 35} → 12345{12345}
has the same signature and is obtained from s by the permutation 41532.
1This is the long version of the signature, which contains many redundant information.
An equivalent shortest (and therefore irredundant) version is τ(s) = (i; (i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . .,
(in−2, jn−2)), where i is the index of S1 in pi1.
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Proposition 3. Under (L), (SN) and (SS), the scenario-value takes the form
ψsi (v) = γ
i
τ(s),|pi|(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)), (4)
for any scenario s and player i, with same notation as in Figure 2, τ(s) is the
signature of the scenario, and |pi| is the number of blocks of pi.
Proof. We know from (L) and (SN) that ψsi (v) takes the form (3). Hence,
for any permutation σ on N we have for any game v
ψ
σ(s)
σ(i) (v ◦ σ−1) = γσ(i)σ(s),σ(Spi)(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)).
The (SS) axiom entails γi
s,Spi = γ
σ(i)
σ(s),σ(S,pi), and this holds for any permuta-
tion σ.
Considering the coefficient γi
s,Spi, we note that Spi ∈ s and i ∈ S \ S−.
Taking a permutation σ, it is plain that τ(σ(s)) = τ(s), |σ(pi)| = |pi|, and
that σ(Spi) ∈ σ(s), σ(i) ∈ σ(S) \ σ(S−). Conversely, take any scenario s′ of
same signature, S ′pi′ ∈ s′ such that |pi′| = |pi| and i′ ∈ S ′ \ S ′−, where S ′−
precedes S ′ in s′. Then there exists some permutation σ such that σ(s) = s′
and since |pi′| = |pi|, we have σ(Spi) = S ′pi′. Now observe that it is not
necessarily true that i′ = σ(i), as shown by the following example:
s =3{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} → 3{12, 3, 4, 5} → 34{12, 34, 5} → 34{125, 34} → N{N}
s′ =3{5, 2, 3, 4, 1} → 3{25, 3, 4, 1} → 34{25, 34, 1} → 34{125, 34} → N{N},
and consider Spi = S ′pi′ = N{N}, and i = i′ = 1. Then σ must necessarily
change 1 into 5, i.e., σ(i) 6= i′. Therefore, the superindex i is necessary.
By analogy with coalitional cooperative games, the unanimity game uSpi
centered on Spi is defined by uSpi(S
′pi′) = 1 if S ′pi′ ⊐ Spi and 0 otherwise.
The last axiom expresses the fact that for the unanimity game uSpi and any
scenario where Spi is a terminal element, there is equal contribution for all
players entering S in the scenario.
Egalitarian axiom (EG): consider a scenario s and Spi, S−pi− ∈
F(s) where S−pi− is the predecessor of Spi in F(s), and |S\S−| >
1. Then ∀i, j ∈ |S \ S−|, ψsi (uSpi) = ψsj (uSpi).
Proposition 4. Under (L), (SN), (SS) and (EG), the scenario-value takes
the form
ψsi (v) = γτ(s),|pi|(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)) (5)
for any scenario s and player i ∈ N (same notation as in Figure 2).
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Proof is immediate from (4).
Our last axiom is efficiency.
Scenario-efficiency axiom (SE): for every s ∈ S,∑i∈N ψsi (v) =
v(N{N}). Similarly, we define process-efficiency (PE) as∑i∈N ψpi (v) =
v(N{N}) for all p ∈ P, and efficiency (E) as ∑i∈N ψi(v) =
v(N{N}).
With some abuse, we say that a scenario-value is (process-)efficient if its
induced (process-)value is. Obviously, scenario-efficiency implies process-
efficiency anf efficiency.
Theorem 1. The unique scenario-value satisfying (L), (SN), (SS), (EG) and
(SE) is given by
φsi (v) =
1
|S \ S−|(v(Spi)− v(S
−pi−)),
with notation of Figure 2. We call it the egalitarian scenario-value.
(see proof in the Appendix) We call coalition formation value the value
induced by the egalitarian scenario-value.
5.3 A second axiomatization
The egalitarian scenario-value is fully characterized by these axioms, which
are very similar to the classical axioms of the Shapley value for TU games.
However, every axiom is restricted to a single scenario in a coalition formation
process, therefore in some sense we have a local axiomatization. Imposing
that each scenario must satisfy these axioms may appear as a strong con-
dition. Our next axiomatization avoids this by using efficiency, the weaker
and most global form of efficiency, instead of the strong and local scenario-
efficiency.
Consider the unanimity game uSpi0, where S is any nonempty coalition,
and pi0 is the finest partition pi0 containing S, i.e., pi0 = {S, pi⊥N\S}, where pi⊥N\S
is the partition of N \ S in singletons. Then, any embedded coalition with
base coalition S has worth 1, and any embedded coalition with base coalition
S− ⊂ S has worth 0, whatever the externalities are. In this situation, for
a fixed S− ⊂ S, it is natural to say that the contribution of a player i ∈
S \ S− does not depend on the scenario s, provided that in the scenario S−
precedes S (more precisely, S−pi− precedes Spi in F(s), for some pi, pi−). Put
more bluntly, the organisation of the players in N \ S is irrelevant to the
contribution of i for the game uSpi0.
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Independence of irrelevant players axiom (IIP): Consider a
nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , and pi0 the finest partition containing
S. Then for every scenarios s, s′ such that Spi ∈ F(s), Spi′ ∈
F(s′), where pi, pi′ are arbitrary partitions containing S, it holds
ψsi (uSpi0) = ψ
s
′
i (uSpi0),
for every i ∈ S \ S−, where S−pi−, S−pi−′ are the predecessors of
Spi, Spi′ in F(s),F(s′) respectively.
Proposition 5. Under (L), (SN), (SS), (EG) and (IIP), we have, for any
scenario s, any Spi ∈ F(s) and its predecessor S−pi− in F(s)
ψsi (v) = γs,s−(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)) (6)
for all i ∈ S \ S−. If S is a singleton, γs,s− is denoted by γ1,0.
Proof. Under (L), (SN), (SS), (EG), we already know that ψsi (v) has the
form (5), with coefficients γτ(s),|pi|. Fix S
− ⊂ S, any i ∈ S \ S− and any two
scenarios s, s′ defined as above. Then by (IIP) we get
γτ(s),|pi| = γτ(s′),|pi′|.
Since pi and pi′ can be any partitions containing S, the coefficients do not de-
pend on pi. Now, τ(s) has the form . . . , (s−, ρ(pi−), (i−, j−)), . . . , (s, ρ(pi), (i, j)), . . .,
and any sequence of that type with s, s− fixed is produced by some s defined
as above. Consequently, the dependency to τ(s) is reduced to the dependency
to s, s−.
Theorem 2. The egalitarian scenario-value is the unique scenario-value sat-
isfying (L), (SN), (SS), (EG), (E) and (IIP).
(see proof in the Appendix)
5.4 Explicit expression of the coalition formation value
Theorem 3. For any game v, the coalition formation value is given by
φi(v) =
1
n
v(N{N}) +
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N)\{N{N}}
T∋i
2(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!t2! · · · tk!v(Tσ)
(7)
−
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N)
T 6∋i
2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!(t2 − 1)! · · · tk!v(Tσ),
where σ := {T, T2, . . . , Tk}, and it is assumed in the third term that i ∈ T2,
the second block of σ.
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(see proof in the Appendix) An equivalent expression, although less com-
putationally efficient, is:
φi(v) =
1
n
v(N{N})
+
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N)
T 6∋i,T2⊃{i}
2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!(t2 − 1)! · · · tk!
[t+ 1
t
v(T ∪ iσT∪i)− v(Tσ)
]
−
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N)
T 6∋i,T2={i}
2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!t3! · · · tk!v(Tσ)
with σT∪i the partition obtained from σ by moving i ∈ T2 to T .
Using (7), we obtain for a three players game (i, j, k denote any three
different players):
φi(v) =
1
3
v(N{N}) + 1
9
v(ij{ij, k}) + 1
9
v(ik{ik, j})− 2
9
v(jk{i, jk}) (8)
+
1
9
v(i{i, jk})− 1
18
v(j{j, ik})− 1
18
v(k{k, ij})
+
2
9
v(i{i, j, k})− 1
9
v(j{i, j, k})− 1
9
v(k{i, j, k}).
It can be checked that this differs from the other values proposed so far for
PFF games (Myerson, Bolger, de Clippel and Serrano, Albizuri, etc., see
Section 7).
5.5 Relation with the Shapley value
If we consider a PFF game with no externality, that is, v(Spi) = v(Spi′) for
any pi and pi′ with pi ∋ S, pi′ ∋ S, it naturally corresponds to a TU game. We
can define the TU game vˆ from the PFF game v by:
vˆ(S) := v(Spi) for any S ∈ 2N , any pi ∋ S.
Most of the values for PFF games coincide with the Shapley value for TU
games when there is no externality. Applying (8) to a game with no exter-
nality we find
φi(vˆ) =
1
3
vˆ(N) +
1
9
vˆ(ij) +
1
9
vˆ(ik)− 2
9
vˆ(jk) +
1
3
vˆ(i)− 1
6
vˆ(j)− 1
6
vˆ(k),
which differs from the original Shapley value. We elaborate more on this
surprising result, and claim that we are able to recover the classical Shapley
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value, provided we use the weighted version of our value. In addition, we will
get an interesting interpretation of the Shapley value in terms of coalition
formation. Let us consider as above a game without externalities. Recall that
the Shapley value can be interpreted as the average marginal contribution of
players when considering all possible ways for the players to enter one by one
the game, i.e., all permutations on N . Now note that this can be represented
as particular processes of coalition formation. Indeed, suppose that players
enter the game in the order 1, 2, . . . , n. This corresponds to the process
{1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → {12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → {123, 4, . . . , n} → · · · → {123 · · ·n},
(9)
with the following convention: in each partition of the process, the first block
is the block of players who have already entered the game (they already form
a coalition), the other ones are the remaining players (they are still outside of
the game). Note also that each process corresponds to two different orders:
in the above example, 2, 1, . . . , n corresponds to the same process. Therefore,
if we want to recover the Shapley value, only those processes should be taken
(there are 2/n! such processes), i.e., their weight is 2
n!
, and the weight of the
other ones is 0. Now, consider the above process and the scenarios s1 of
player 1 and s2 of player 2:
1{1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → 12{12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → 123{123, 4, . . . , n} → · · · → N{N}
2{1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → 12{12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → 123{123, 4, . . . , n} → · · · → N{N}.
Note that player 1 is the only one present from the beginning in the order
1, 2, . . . , n, and similarly for player 2 in the order 2, 1, . . . , n. Hence only
these players can have an internal view of the process, i.e., only scenarios
s1, s2 must be considered. We claim:
Proposition 6. The Shapley value for the TU game vˆ is obtained by
φSi (vˆ) =
2
n!
∑
pσ
(1
2
φ
sσ(1)←pσ
i (v)+
1
2
φ
sσ(2)←pσ
i (v)
)
=
1
n!
∑
pσ
(
φ
sσ(1)←pσ
i (v)+φ
sσ(2)←pσ
i (v)
)
,
for i ∈ N , and sσ(1) ← pσ denotes the scenario of player σ(1) in the process
of type (9) induced by σ, that is
{σ(1), σ(2), σ(3), . . . , σ(n)} → {σ(1)σ(2), σ(3), σ(4), . . . , σ(n)} → · · · → {N}.
Proof. By definition of the Shapley value as an average of marginal contri-
butions, we have
φSi (vˆ) =
1
n!
∑
σ
(
vˆ(Sσσ−1(i))− vˆ(Sσσ−1(i)−1)
)
, (10)
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with Sσi := {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}, and S0 := ∅.
Consider the process pσ induced by the permutation σ, and the two orders
corresponding to pσ, namely σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(n) and σ(2), σ(1), . . . , σ(n). It
suffices to show that for any player, the marginal contributions for these two
orders in (10) coincide with the term for pσ.
Consider first any player i 6= σ(1), σ(2). Then its marginal contribution is
identical for these two orders, and is in total 2
n!
(
vˆ(Sσσ−1(i))− vˆ(Sσσ−1(i)−1
)
for
the two orders. Consider now player σ(1). In the first order, its contribution
is 1
n!
vˆ(σ(1)), while it is 1
n!
(
v(σ(1)σ(2))− v(σ(2))
)
in the second order. The
situation is symmetric for player σ(2).
On the other hand, we have for any player i 6= σ(1), σ(2):
φ
sσ(1)←pσ
i (v) = v(S
σ
σ−1(i){Sσσ−1(i), pi⊥N\Sσ
σ−1(i)
})− v(Sσσ−1(i)−1{Sσσ−1(i)−1, pi⊥N\Sσ
σ−1(i)−1
})
= vˆ(Sσσ−1(i))− vˆ(Sσσ−1(i)−1)
= φ
sσ(2)←pσ
i (v),
where we used the notation pi⊥S to denote a partition of a set S in singletons.
Similarly, we obtain for i = σ(1), σ(2):
φ
sσ(1)←pσ
σ(1) (v) = vˆ(σ(1))
φ
sσ(2)←pσ
σ(1) (v) = vˆ(σ(1)σ(2))− vˆ(σ(2)),
which proves the desired equality.
Hence, the difference between the classical Shapley value and our value
lies in the discarded scenarios s3, . . . , sn in each process pσ and the discarded
processes. While it is clear why processes other than the pσ’s should be
discarded, let us explain why those scenarios are discarded. In Shapley’s
view, there is a distinction between players already in the game (those in the
room) and those still outside the game. Note that in process (9), only player
1 or player 2 can be first in the room and be present during all the process of
formation of the grand coalition, and these correspond precisely to scenarios
s1, s2. By contrast, in a coalition formation process, all players are always
present in the game, only the structure of the society evolves. Therefore, all
scenarios have to be taken into account. In summary, a well-defined coalition
formation value should never collapse to the classical Shapley value.
Similarly, it is possible to recover the value φCS of de Clippel and Ser-
rano [5] (and therefore of Pham Do and Norde [7], since they coincide, see
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Section 7). Its formula is
φCSi (v) = φ
S
i (v˜), i ∈ N,
where v˜(S) := v(S{S, pi⊥N\S}). Due to the definition of v˜, we see that the
proof of Proposition 6 can be applied without any change. Therefore
φCSi (v) =
1
n!
∑
pσ
(
φ
sσ(1)←pσ
i (v) + φ
sσ(2)←pσ
i (v)
)
, i ∈ N.
6 Application to the Cournot oligopoly ex-
ample
We come back to our motivating example of Section 3, and solve it with
our proposed value. Since in this example, we are interested into specific
processes, the adequate notion is the process-value.
We begin by considering a 4-person game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the
two typical coalition formation processes p and p′, defined in Section 3:
p : {1, 2, 3, 4} → {12, 3, 4} → {123, 4} → {1234}
p′ : {1, 2, 3, 4} → {12, 3, 4} → {12, 34} → {1234}
The Shapley process-values of the processes p and p′ are given by
φp =
(
2v1 + v2 + 3v3
24
,
2v1 + v2 + 3v3
24
,
v1 + 5v2 − 3v3
12
,
3v1 − 2v2
4
)
φp
′
=
(v1
4
,
v1
4
,
v1
4
,
v1
4
)
These are the averages of the four Shapley scenario-values induced from the
corresponding processes p and p′. These values are interpreted as average
contributions of the players in the processes. They are symmetric for p′, but
not for p, as expected. Note that φp does not depend on v4 and φ
p
1 = φ
p
2 .
This is because in the first step of coalition formation process p, the roles of
players 1 and 2 are very similar since both are first players to enter, and v4
has no influence in that case. Here we could compare the contributions of
the same firm in the two different processes.
This result can be extended to the general case. First we give the Shapley
process-value for the following coalition formation process p in an n-person
game.
p : {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → {12, 3, . . . , n} → {123, . . . , n} → · · · → {N}
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The value becomes
φpk =
1
n
[
vn−k+2 + (k − 1)(vn−k+1 − vn−k+2) +
n−1∑
j=k
1
j
(vn−j − vn−j+1)
]
for k = 2, . . . , n− 1, and
φp1 = φ
p
2 , φ
p
n =
1
n
[v2 + (n− 1)(v1 − v2)] .
Consider next the case of n = 2m and a process p′ defined by
p′ : {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , n} → {12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → {12, 34, . . . , n} → · · · → {12, 34, . . . , (n− 1)n}
→ {1234, . . . , (n− 1)n} → · · · → {1234, . . . , (n− 3)(n− 2)(n− 1)n} → · · ·
→ {12345678, . . . , (n− 3)(n− 2)(n− 1)n} → · · · → {123 · · · (2m−1), (2m−1 + 1) · · ·n} → {N}
The Shapley process-value for process p′ is given by φp
′
k =
v1
n
for k = 1, . . . , n,
which shows that everyone has a perfectly symmetric role in this process.
Next we apply this to the Cournot oligopoly problem, with vk =
1
(k+1)2
(see Section 3). We find
φpk =
1
n(n− k + 3)2+
(k − 1)(2n− 2k + 5)
n(n− k + 2)2(n− k + 3)2+
n−1∑
j=k
2n− 2j + 3
nj(n− j + 1)2(n− j + 2)2
for k = 2, . . . , n−1,
φp1 = φ
P
2 , φ
p
n =
5n− 1
36n
φp
′
k =
1
4n
for k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Moreover it holds that for k = 2, . . . , n− 1,
φpk+1−φpk =
1
n
[
vn−k+1 − vn−k+2 + (k − 1
k
)(vn−k − vn−k+1)− (k − 1)(vn−k+1 − vn−k+2)
]
.
Since vk =
1
(k+1)2
is a concave decreasing function, the Shapley process-value
φpk of player k satisfies φ
p
1 = φ
p
2 < φ
p
3 ... < φ
p
n, because vn−k+1 − vn−k+2 >
0, k − 1
k
> k − 1 and vn−k − vn−k+1 > vn−k+1 − vn−k+2.
This shows that when players enter the game one by one, the later a
player joins the current coalition, the more the contribution of this player in
Cournot oligopoly, as expected.
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For the sake of completeness, we give numerical results for the 4-person
case.
φp ≈ 1
4
(.138, .138, .206, .528), φp
′
=
1
4
(.25, .25, .25, .25).
The last player gets more profit in process p, which is more than one half.
Symmetric values for PFF games give the equal division 1
4
(.25, .25, .25, .25)
and do not say anything about a coalition formation process. However our
Shapley process-value shows the difference between two processes p and p′.
Process p′ is more egalitarian than process p. Even in a symmetric oligopoly,
the coalition formation process matters a lot.
7 Related works and concluding remarks.
As we discussed in the three person example (Section 5.4), the coalition
formation value differs from other values of PFF games, since our value
reflects the whole (dynamic) process of formation of coalitions, while the
others one are more related to the coalitional (static) view of games. Here
we make a comparison of the different axiom systems.
Myerson’s value of a PFF game (Myerson [14]) is uniquely determined by
the following three axioms: (S: symmetry) for any permutation σ, ψi(v) =
ψσi(σv), (ADD: additivity) for any two games v, w, ψ(v+w) = ψ(v)+ψ(w),
and (CAR: carrier) if T is a carrier, that is, v(Tpi) = v(T ∩ S, pi ∧ {T,N \
T}) ∀Spi ∈ Σ(N), then∑k∈T ψk(v) = v(N, {N}). (ADD) is a bit weaker but
almost the same as (L). (CAR) is an extension of that in TU games, which
is equivalent to the null axiom and the efficiency for the original Shapley
value. In this sense it is a direct generalization of an axiom system for the
original Shapley value. The most different axiom from our axiomatization of
our scenario-value is (CAR). It is important to mention that the Myerson’s
value of a PFF game in three person game is not monotonic: if v(i{i, j, k})
increases, the Myerson’s value of player i decreases.
Bolger’s value (Bolger [4]) of a PFF game is uniquely determined by the
following five axioms: (S),(L), (E: efficiency), (B-null) if j is a null player,
that is, v(Spi) = v(S \ {j}pi′) for any S, pi, pi′ such that j ∈ S ∈ pi, pi′ =
{T ∪ j, S1 \ j, . . . , Sk \ j} with pi = {T, S1, . . . , Sk}, j ∈ N \T , then ψj(v) = 0,
and (MM: Modified Marginality) for any two games v, w, and i ∈ N , if for
any S ∋ i, and pi ∋ S,∑T∈pi,T 6=S[v(S, pi)−v(S\i, αiT )] =∑T∈pi,T 6=S[w(S, pi)−
w(S \ i, αiT )], then ψi(v) = ψi(w), where for i ∈ S, pi = {S, T, S1, S2, . . . , Sk},
αiT = {S \ {i}, T ∪ i, S1, . . . , Sk}. Axioms (MM) as well as (B-null) are
needed, which are both very strong. Again (B-null) is very different from our
(SN).
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Pham Do and Norde ([7]) proposed a value of a PFF game which is
uniquely determined by the following four axioms: (S), (ADD), (E) and (DN-
null): if j is a null player, that is, v(S, pi∪{{j}}) = v(S∪{j}, (pi\{S})∪{S∪
j}) for any S ⊆ N \ {j}, for any pi ∈ Π(N \ {j}), then φj(v) = 0. Fujinaka
[8] gives a different axiomatization of the same value using (M:Marginality)
for any two games v, w, if v(S ∪{j}, (pi \ {S})∪{S ∪ j})− v(S, pi∪ {{j}}) =
w(S ∪ {j}, (pi \ {S}) ∪ {S ∪ j}) − w(S, pi ∪ {{j}})for any S ⊆ N \ {j}, for
any pi ∈ Π(N \ {j}), then φj(v) = φj(w). He characterizes it by (S), (ADD),
and (M). de Clippel and Serrano ([5]) also give another axiomatization of the
same value using a balanced contribution axiom. Again the key difference
is based on the null axiom (DN-null). The important remark is that the
formula of their value of a PFF game v is given by φ(v) = Shapley(v˜), where
v˜(S) = v(S, {S, {k}k∈N\S}), and Shapley(v˜) is the Shapley value of TU game
v˜. This means their value does not utilize the full information of the PFF
game.
Macho-Stadler et al. ([13]) proposed a collection of values for PFF games,
called average values. They are characterized by (SS: strong symmetry),
which is a stronger version of symmetry, (L), (E), and (B-null). The typical
representative of this family is given by this formula: φ(v) = Shapley(v¯),
where v¯(S) = 1
#{pi∈Π|pi∋S}
∑
{pi∈Π|pi∋S} v(Spi). It satisfies in addition (SI: simi-
lar influence): if players i and j have similar influence in games v, v′, that is,
v = v′ except for 2 elements S{S, i, j, S2, . . . , Sk} and S{S, {i, j}, S2, . . . , Sk},
and v(S{S, i, j, S2, . . . , Sk}) = v′(S{S, {i, j}, S2, . . . , Sk}), v(S{S, {i, j}, S2, . . . , Sk}) =
v′(S{S, i, j, S2, . . . , Sk}), then ψi(v) = ψi(w), and ψj(v) = ψj(w). This value
is also characterized by Albizuri et al. [1]. Clearly it utilizes the full infor-
mation given by the PFF game.
Our scenario-value is different from any of the values above, mainly be-
cause it is not the (classical) Shapley value of some TU game induced by
the PFF game. Therefore, the null player axiom of the Shapley value of
TU games naturally induces the above special null axioms for PFF games,
which all differ from our null axiom. Moreover, we claim that the underly-
ing structure of embedded coalitions (which is not explicitely mentionned in
the above cited works) is implicitly suggested by the null axioms which are
employed. Indeed, in the case of TU games, the null axiom is based on the
difference between the worths of S and S \ i, assuming S ∋ i. These elements
are “neighbors” in the lattice (2N ,⊆). In the PFF case, our scenario null ax-
iom is defined along a maximal chain of Σ(N)⊥. The B-null axiom takes the
difference of worth between S{S, S2, . . . , Sk} and S \ i{S \ i, S2 ∪ i, . . . , Sk},
for S ∋ i. In Σ(N)⊥, these elements are not neighbors because they are on
the same level. To recover them as neighbors, one possibility is the following:
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take the Boolean lattice (2N ,⊆). Duplicate each element S as many times
there are different possible coalition structures containing S, and indicate
these coalition structures. Put all possible links between duplicates of an
element S and duplicates of an element T if and only if these elements are
linked in the Boolean lattice. Doing so, the B-nullity condition appears for
neighbors elements. This structure also explains well the average approach:
it can almost be seen on the picture. For illustration, we give Σ(N) and the
structure induced by B-nullity for n = 3 on Figures 3 and 4.
⊥
1{1, 2, 3}2{1, 2, 3}3{1, 2, 3}
12{12, 3}3{12, 3}1{1, 23}23{1, 23}13{13, 2}2{13, 2}
123{123}
Figure 3: Diagram of (Σ(3)⊥,≤). Elements with the same partition are
framed in grey. Elements in nullity condition of player 1 are linked by a
dashed line
∅
1{1, 2, 3} 2{1, 2, 3} 3{1, 2, 3}
12{12, 3}
3{12, 3}1{1, 23}
23{1, 23}13{13, 2}
2{13, 2}
123{123}
Figure 4: Diagram of the structure induced by the B-null axiom, used by
Bolger, and Macho-Stadler et al. n = 3. Elements with same coalition
(duplicates) are framed in grey. Elements in B-nullity condition of player 1
are linked by a dashed line
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Appendix - Proofs of theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
The fact that the egalitarian scenario-value satisfies (L), (SN), (SS), (EG)
and (SE) is easy to check and left to the reader.
Conversely, let s = {∅pi⊥, S1pi1,1, . . . , S1pi1,m1 , S2pi2,1, . . . , S2pi2,m2 , . . . , Skpik,1, . . .,
Skpik,mk , N{N}} be fixed.
From Proposition 4 we get:∑
i∈N
ψsi (v) = γτ(s),|pi1,m1 |v(S1pi1,m1) + |S2 \ S1|γτ(s),|pi2,m2 |
(
v(S2pi2,m2)− v(S1pi1,m1)
)
+
· · ·+ |Sj \ Sj−1|γτ(s),|pij,mj |
(
v(Sjpij,mj)− v(Sj−1pij−1,mj−1)
)
+
· · ·+ |N \ Sk|γτ(s),1
(
v(N{N})− v(Skpik,mk)
)
=
(
γτ(s),|pi1,m1 | − |S2 \ S1|γτ(s),|pi2,m2 |
)
v(S1pi1,m1)+
· · ·+ (|Sj \ Sj−1|γτ(s),|pij,mj | − |Sj+1 \ Sj |γτ(s),|pij+1,mj+1 |)v(Sjpij,mj)+
· · ·+ |N \ Sk|γτ(s),1v(N{N}).
From the (SE) axiom, we deduce the following linear system of k+1 equations
and k + 1 unknowns:
γτ(s),|pi1,m1 | − |S2 \ S1|γτ(s),|pi2,m2 | = 0
... = 0
|Sj \ Sj−1|γτ(s),|pij,mj | − |Sj+1 \ Sj |γτ(s),|pij+1,mj+1 | = 0
... = 0
|N \ Sk|γτ(s),1 = 1.
Evidently the system is nonsingular, since from the last equation γτ(s),1 is
obtained, then substituting it into the last but one, we get γτ(s),|pik,mk | and
so on. Knowing that the coefficients of the egalitarian scenario-value are
solutions of the system, it is the unique solution.
25
Proof of Theorem 2
Again, the egalitarian-scenario-value clearly satisfies these axioms.
Conversely, let us assume that the scenario-value satisfies the five axioms,
and let us compute
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈S ψ
s
i (v). From
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈S ψ
s
i (v) = v(N{N}),
we get a system of linear equations, one per element Spi. We know that there
exists at least one solution to this system, since our egalitarian scenario-value
satisfies the five axioms. Our task will be to prove that this is the only
solution. To this aim, we will prove that there are at least as many equations
as variables, and that there exists a subsystem which can be made triangular.
First, we determine the form of the equation for element Spi := S{S, S2, . . . , Sk},
assuming Spi is any element different from N{N} and S is not a singleton.
From (6), there is a negative contribution for v(Spi) with coefficient −γs+,s
for all S+pi+ such that S+pi+ ⊐ Spi, |S+| = s+, pi+ := {S+, S+2 , . . . , S+k+},
and S+ = S ∪ Sj , for some j = 2, . . . , k, for all i ∈ S+ \ S, and all scenarios
s passing through S+pi+ and Spi, such that S+pi+, Spi ∈ F(s). Hence, any
scenario of the following form, with S+ = S ∪ Sj :
⊥, . . . , Spi, S ∪ Sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
S+
piS∪Sj , . . . , S ∪ Sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
S+
pi+, S+∪S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, . . . , N{N}, l = 2, . . . , k+
will lead to a negative contribution with coefficient −γs+,s. The notation
piS∪Sj , etc., is a shorthand for (pi \ {S, Sj}) ∪ {S ∪ Sj}. The set of all such
scenarios (for j fixed, i.e., S+ fixed) is obtained as all possible combinations
of:
(i) all sub-scenarios from ⊥ to Spi;
(ii) all sub-scenarios from S ∪ SjpiS∪Sj to S ∪ Sjpi+, for all possible pi+
coarser than piS∪Sj and containing S ∪ Sj ;
(iii) for a given pi+, all sub-scenarios from S+∪S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
to the top N{N},
for l = 2, . . . , k+.
Hence the number of such scenarios is
βs+sj ,s,pi = |C([⊥, Spi])|
∑
pi+>pi
pi+∋S∪Sj
(
|C([piS∪Sj , pi+])|×
k+∑
l=2
|C([S+∪S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, N{N}])|
)
,
where the notation C([⊥, Spi]) stands for the set of maximal chains from ⊥ to
Spi, and so on (for the second term, since the coalition is always S+, we can
omit it). Although this number seems difficult to compute (!), it depends
ultimately only on k, s, s2, . . . sk, hence on the number of blocks of pi and
their cardinality. Indeed, the following results are shown in [12].
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• Consider two distinct elements pi, pi′ ∈ Π(n), with pi′ < pi. Then
|C([pi′, pi])| = (k
′ − k)!
2k′−k
l1!l2! · · · lk!
with pi := {S1, . . . , Sk}, pi′ := {S11, . . . , S1l1 , S21, . . . , S2l2 , . . . , Sklk},
with {Si1, . . . , Sili} a partition of Si, i = 1, . . . , k, and k′ :=
∑k
i=1 li.
• Let Spi be an embedded coalition, with pi := {S, S2 . . . , Sk}. The num-
ber of maximal chains from ⊥ to Spi is
|C([⊥, Spi)])| = s(n− k)!
2n−k
s!s2! · · · sk!.
• Let Spi be an embedded coalition, with pi := {S, S2 . . . , Sk}. The num-
ber of maximal chains from Spi to N{N} is
|C([Spi,N{N}])| = 1
k
|C(Σ(k)⊥)| = k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
.
We deduce from this:
|C([piS∪Sj , pi+])| =
(k − 1− k+)!
2k−1−k+
1.l+2 ! · · · l+k+!
|C([S+ ∪ S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, N{N}])| = (k
+ − 1)!(k+ − 2)!
2k+−2
with l+2 , . . . , l
+
k+
being the numbers of blocks in piS∪Sj corresponding to S
+
2 , . . . , S
+
k+.
Clearly, |C([⊥, Spi)])| depends only on k and the cardinality of blocks of pi.
For |C([piS∪Sj , pi+])|, doing the summation over pi+, we have that k+ will vary
from 2 to k − 1. Accordingly, each l+j will vary from 1 (when k+ = k − 1) to
k (when k+ = 2). Hence the second term (after summation) depends only
on k. Similarly, |C([S+ ∪ S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, N{N}])| depends only on k.
Similarly, there is a positive contribution for v(Spi) with coefficient γs,s−
for all S−pi− such that S−pi− ⊏ Spi, |S−| = s−, and S = S− ∪ S−1 for some
S−1 ∈ pi−, all i ∈ S \S−, and all scenarios s passing through elements Spi and
S−pi−, so that Spi, S−pi− ∈ F(s). Hence, any scenario of the following form,
with S−pi− defined as above
⊥, . . . , S−pi−, S− ∪ S−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
pi−
S−∪S−1
, . . . , Spi, S∪SjpiS∪Sj , . . . , N{N}, j = 2, . . . , k
27
will lead to a positive contribution with coefficient γs,s−. The number of such
scenarios is, reasoning as above,
αs,s−,pi =
∑
S−⊂S,|S−|=s−
pi−<pi,pi−∋S−,S−1
s.t. S=S−∪S−1
(
|C([⊥, S−pi−])|×|C([pi−
S−∪S−1
, pi])|
)
×
k∑
j=2
|C([S∪SjpiS∪Sj , N{N}])|
Again, this number depends only on s−, the number of blocks of pi and their
cardinality. In summary, the equation for Spi 6= N{N} is
∑
s−<s
(s− s−)αs,s−,piγs,s− −
k∑
j=2
sjβs+sj ,s,piγs+sj,s = 0.
Let us address briefly the case of singletons and N . If S = {i}, the first
term is replaced by α1,0,piγ1,0, with
α1,0,pi =
k∑
j=2
|C([S ∪ SjpiS∪Sj , N{N}])|.
If S = N , the second term does not exist. In summary:
α1,0,piγ1,0 +
k∑
j=2
(s+ − s)βs+sj ,s,piγs+sj,s = 0, (S is a singleton)∑
n−<n
(n− n−)αn,n−,{N}γn,n− = v(N{N}), (Spi = N{N}). (11)
From the above considerations, equations for Spi and S ′pi′ will be identical
if and only if s = s′, and pi and pi′ are of the same type (same number of blocks
and same cardinality of blocks). Hence, the number of different equations
for |S| = s is the number of integer partitions of n− s, denoted by p(n− s),
for s = 1, . . . , n (for n = s, there is only one equation, which is (11). Hence
we put p(0) := 1). For example, the numbers of integer partitions of 1, 2, 3,
4 are respectively 1, 2, 3, 5. Hence, for n = 2, 3, 4, 5 we have respectively 2,
4, 7, and 12 different equations.
The number of variables γs,s′ is much easier to compute. For s = 1, there
is only one variable, namely γ1,0. For 1 < s ≤ n fixed, s′ varies from 1 to
s− 1. Hence the total number of variables is:
1 +
n∑
s=2
(s− 1) =
n∑
s=2
s− n+ 2 = n
2 − n + 2
2
.
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This gives for n = 2, 3, 4, 5 players, 2, 4, 7, 11 variables. It is easy to see that
this number is less or equal than the number of equations. Indeed, for large
n, the following formula is known:
p(n) ≈ 1
4n
√
3
exp
(
pi
(
2n
3
) 1
2)
which is clearly exponential (see Andrews [2]).
It remains to find a subsystem of equations which can be made triangular.
Let us order the variables as follows: γ1,0, γ2,1, γ3,1, γ3,2, γ4,1, . . .. For each
variable γs′,s, except for γ1,0, let us find an equation using only variables up
to γs′,s. It suffices to take the equation for Spi such that the largest block of
pi \ {S} is of size s′− s. Doing so for all γs′,s, we form a subsystem. If in this
subsystem, we put for each equation γ1,0 on the right side, the subsystem
becomes triangular. So it has a unique solution in terms of γ1,0, which can
be determined by substituting all variables in the equation corresponding to
Spi = N{N}. This proves the uniqueness of the solution.
Proof of Theorem 3
We consider the elementary games eTσ for any Tσ ∈ Σ(N), defined by
eTσ(T
′σ′) = 1 iff Tσ = T ′σ′, and 0 otherwise. We have for any game v
in Γ(N), v =
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N) v(Tσ)eTσ. Since the egalitarian scenario-value is
linear, so is the value. Hence, for any game v in Γ(N),
φi(v) =
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N)
v(Tσ)φi(eTσ).
It remains to compute φi(eTσ) for all i ∈ N and all Tσ ∈ Σ(N).
A first important thing is to notice that symmetry (SS) implies φi(eTσ) =
φj(eTσ) for all i, j ∈ T . Indeed, consider any permutation τ such that τ(T ) =
T , and τ is the identity on N \ T . Then, for any i ∈ T ,
φi(eTσ) =
∑
s
φsi (eTσ) =
∑
s
φ
τ(s)
τ(i) (eTσ◦τ−1) =
∑
s′
φs
′
τ(i)(eτ(Tσ)) =
∑
s′
φs
′
τ(i)(eTσ) = φτ(i)(eTσ).
From this and efficiency we immediately have:
φi(eN{N}) =
1
n
, ∀i ∈ N. (12)
Let us consider a given Tσ ∈ Σ(N), Tσ 6= N{N}, and consider any i 6∈ T .
Let us put for convenience σ = {T, T2, . . . , Tk} and consider that i ∈ T2. A
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scenario s induces φsi (eTσ) 6= 0 if and only if s contains Tσ and the successor
of Tσ in s is T ∪ T2σT∪T2 , with σT∪T2 := (σ \ {T, T2})∪ {T ∪ T2}, and in this
case φsi (eTσ) = − 1t2 . The number of such scenarios is (see proof of Th. 2)
t(n− k)!
2n−2
t!t2! · · · tk!(k − 1)!(k − 2)!,
hence
φi(eTσ) = −2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!(t2 − 1)! · · · tk!, ∀i ∈ T2. (13)
Establishing the corresponding formulas when i ∈ T3, . . . , Tk successively we
deduce ∑
i6∈T
φi(eTσ) = −2t(k − 1)(n− k)!
n!n!
t!t2! · · · tk!(k − 1)!(k − 2)!,
hence, by efficiency we get:∑
i∈T
φi(eTσ) = 0−
∑
i6∈T
φi(eTσ)
=
2t(k − 1)(n− k)!
n!n!
t!t2! · · · tk!(k − 1)!(k − 2)!
which gives by symmetry:
φi(eTσ) =
2(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!t2! · · · tk!, ∀i ∈ T. (14)
Hence for any game v, we obtain:
φi(v) =
1
n
v(N{N}) +
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N)\{N{N}}
T∋i
2(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!t2! · · · tk!v(Tσ)
−
∑
Tσ∈Σ(N)
T 6∋i
2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!(t2 − 1)! · · · tk!v(Tσ).
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